Abstract. This paper studies n-player games where players beliefs about their opponents behaviour are capacities. The concept of an equilibrium under uncertainty was introduced J.Dow and S.Werlang (J Econ. Theory 64 (1994) 205-224)) for two players and was extended to n-player games by J.Eichberger and D.Kelsey (Games Econ. Behav. 30 (2000) 183-215). Expected utility was expressed by Choquet integral. We consider the concept of an equilibrium under uncertainty in this paper but with expected utility expressed by Sugeno integral. Existence of such an equilibrium is demonstrated using some abstract non-linear convexity on the space of capacities.
Introduction
The classical Nash equilibrium theory is based on fixed point theory and was developed in frames of linear convexity. The mixed strategies of a player are probability (additive) measures on a set of pure strategies. But an interest to Nash equilibria in more general frames is rapidly growing in last decades. There are also results about Nash equilibrium for non-linear convexities. For instance, Briec and Horvath proved in [1] existence of Nash equilibrium point for B-convexity and MaxPlus convexity. Let us remark that MaxPlus convexity is related to idempotent (Maslov) measures in the same sense as linear convexity is related to probability measures.
We can use additive measures only when we know precisely probabilities of all events considered in a game. However it is not a case in many modern economic models. The decision theory under uncertainty considers a model when probabilities of states are either not known or imprecisely specified. Gilboa [7] and Schmeidler [14] axiomatized expectations expressed by Choquet integrals attached to non-additive measures called capacities, as a formal approach to decision-making under uncertainty. Dow and Werlang [3] used this approach for two players game where belief of each player about a choice of the strategy by the other player is a capacity. They introduced some equilibrium notion for such games and proved its existence. This result was extended onto games with arbitrary finite number of players [6] .
Kozhan and Zaricznyi introduced in [8] a formal mathematical concept of Nash equilibrium of a game where players are allowed to form non-additive beliefs about opponent's decision but also to play their mixed non-additive strategies. Such game is called by authors game in capacities. The expected payoff function was there defined using a Choquet integral. Kozhan and Zaricznyi proved existence theorem using a linear convexity on the space of capacities which is preserved by Choquet integral.
An alternative to so-called Choquet expected utility model is the qualitative decision theory. The corresponding expected utility is expressed by Sugeno integral. See for example papers [4] , [5] , [2] , [13] and others. Sugeno integral chooses a median value of utilities which is qualitative counterpart of the averaging operation by Choquet integral. It was introduced in [11] the general mathematical concept of Nash equilibrium of a game in capacities with expected payoff function defined by Sugeno integral. To prove existence theorem for this case, it was considered some non-linear convexity on the space of capacities generated by capacity monad structure.
It was noticed in [8] that "there is no direct interpretation of the game in nonadditive mixed strategies". So, formal mathematical concept of Nash equilibrium for capacities considered in [8] and [11] has rather theoretical character. We consider in this paper the equilibrium notion from [3] and [6] for a game with expected payoff function defined by Sugeno integral. We prove existence of such equilibrium using above mentioned convexity on the space of capacities.
Games with non-additive beliefs
By Comp we denote the category of compact Hausdorff spaces (compacta) and continuous maps. For each compactum X we denote by C(X) the Banach space of all continuous functions on X with the usual sup-norm. In what follows, all spaces and maps are assumed to be in Comp except for R and maps in sets C(X) with X compact Hausdorff.
We need the definition of capacity on a compactum X. We follow a terminology of [9] . A function ν which assign each closed subset A of X a real number ν(A) ∈ [0, 1] is called an upper-semicontinuous capacity on X if the three following properties hold for each closed subsets F and G of X:
We extend a capacity ν to all open subsets U ⊂ X by the formula ν(U ) = sup{ν(K) | K is a closed subset of X such that K ⊂ U }.
It was proved in [9] that the space M X of all upper-semicontinuous capacities on a compactum X is a compactum as well, if a topology on M X is defined by a subbase that consists of all sets of the form
Since all capacities we consider here are upper-semicontinuous, in the following we call elements of M X simply capacities.
There is considered in [8] a tensor product for capacities, which is a continuous map
This definition is based on the capacity monad structure. We give there a direct formulae for evaluating tensor product of capacities. For
Note that, despite the space of capacities contains the space of probability measures, the tensor product of capacities does not extend tensor product of probability measures. It was noticed in [8] that we can extend the definition of tensor product to any finite number of factors by induction.
Proof. Consider the case n = 2. Let B any compact subset of (X 1 ×X 2 )\(A 1 ×A 2 ). For any t > 0 consider the set
The general case could be obtained by induction.
Let us describe the Sugeno integral with respect to a capacity µ ∈ M X. Fix any increasing homeomorphism ψ : (0, 1) → R. We put additionally ψ(0) = −∞, ψ(1) = +∞ and assume −∞ < t < +∞ for each t ∈ R. We consider for each function f ∈ C(X) an integral defined by the formulae
Let us remark that we use some modification from [12] of Sugeno integral. The original Sugeno integral [15] "ignores" function values outside the interval [0, 1] and we introduce a "correction" homeomorphism ψ to avoid this problem. Now, we are going to introduce notion of equilibrium under uncertainty for games where belief of each player about a choice of the strategy by the other player is a capacity. We follow definitions and denotation from [6] with the only difference that we use the Sugeno integral for expected payoff instead the Choquet integral.
We consider a n-players game f : X = n i=1 X i → R n with compact Hausdorff spaces of strategies X i . The coordinate function p i : X → R we call payoff function of i-th player. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we denote by X −i = j =i X j the set of strategy combinations which players other than i could choose. For x ∈ X the corresponding point in X −i we denote by x −i . In contrast to standard game theory, beliefs of i-th player about opponents behaviour are represented by non-additive measures (or capacities) on X −i .
For i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we consider the expected payoff function P i :
We are going to prove continuity of P i . We will need some notations and a technical lemma. Let f : X × Y → R be a function. Consider any x ∈ X and t ∈ R. Denote A x ≤t = {y ∈ Y | f (x, y) ≤ t}. We also will use analogous notations A 
The proof of the second statement is the same.
Lemma 3. The map P i is continuous.
Proof. Consider any x ∈ X i and ν 0 ∈ M X −i and put P i (x, ν 0 ) = t ∈ R. Consider any ε > 0. By Lemma 2 we can choose a neighborhood O 1 of x such that for each
We also can choose a neighborhood O 2 of x such that for each z ∈ O 2 we have A
On the other hand, since (z,
. Hence P i (z, ν) > t−ε and the map P i is continuous.
the best response correspondence of player i given belief ν i . The set R i is well defined and compact by Lemma 3.
A belief system (ν 1 , . . . , ν n ), where ν i ∈ M (X −i ), is called an equilibrium under uncertainty with Sugeno payoff if for all i we have
The main goal of this paper is to prove the existence of such equilibrium. Since Sugeno integral does not preserve linear convexity on M X, we can not use methods from [3] and [6] . We will use some another natural convexity structure on the space of capacities which has the binarity property (has Helly number 2).
Binary convexity on the space of capacities
Consider a compactum X. There exists a natural lattice structure on M X defined as follows ν ∨µ(A) = max{ν(A), µ(A)} and ν ∧µ(A) = min{ν(A), µ(A)} for each closed subset A ⊂ X and ν, µ ∈ M X. The lattice M X is a compact complete sublattice of the lattice [0, 1] τ with natural coordinate-wise operations. The lattice M X has a greatest element and a a least element defined as µ 1X (A) = 1 for each A = ∅, µ 1X (∅) = 0 and µ 0X (A) = 0 for each A = X, µ 0X (X) = 1.
By convexity on M X we mean any family C of closed subsets which is stable for intersection and contains M X and the empty set. Elements of C are called C-convex (or simply convex). See [16] for more information about abstract convexities.
A convexity C on M X is called T 2 if for each distinct x 1 , x 2 ∈ M X there exist S 1 , S 2 ∈ C such that S 1 ∪ S 2 = X, x 1 / ∈ S 2 and x 2 / ∈ S 1 . Let L be a family of subsets of a compactum X. We say that L is linked if the intersection of every two elements is non-empty. A convexity C is called binary if the intersection of every linked subsystem of C is non-empty.
It is easy to see that [ν, µ] is a closed subset of M X. We consider on M X a convexity
Lemma 4. The convexity C X is binary.
Proof. Let B is a linked subfamily of C. It is enough to prove that intersection of every three elements of B is not empty by Proposition 2.1 from [10] . Consider any
We can suppose that µ i ≤ ν i for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We denote by ν A = ∧{ν i | i ∈ A} and µ A = ∨{µ i | i ∈ A} for each A ⊂ {1, 2, 3}. It is enough to prove that µ 123 (B) ≤ ν 123 .
Suppose the contrary then there exists a closed set B ⊂ X such that ν 123 (B) < µ 123 (B). We can choose i ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that ν 123 (B) < µ i (B). Without loss of generality we can suppose that i = 1. Since the family Proof. Consider any µ, ν ∈ M X such that µ = ν. Then there exists a closed subset A ⊂ X such that µ(A) = ν(A). We can suppose that µ(A) < ν(A). Put a = µ(A)+ν(A) 2
and consider sets O 1 = {α ∈ M X | α(A) ≥ a} and O 2 = {α ∈ M X | α(A) ≤ a}. Consider the capacity ν 1 ∈ M X defined as follows ν 1 (C) = 0 if A \ C = ∅, ν 1 (C) = a if A ⊂ C and C = X and ν 1 (X) = 1 for a closed subset C ⊂ X. Then we have that
Analogously, we can consider the capacity ν 2 ∈ M X defined as follows ν 2 (∅) = 0
The main result
We will prove existence of equilibrium introduced in Section 2, moreover we will show that each ν i could be represented as tensor product of capacities on factors.
By a multimap (set-valued map) of a set X into a set Y we mean a map F : X → 2 Y . We use the notation F : X ⊸ Y . If X and Y are topological spaces, then a multimap
It is well-known that a multimap is USC iff its graph is closed in X × Y .
Let F : X ⊸ X be a multimap. We say that a point x ∈ X is a fixed point of F if x ∈ F (x). The following counterpart of Kakutani theorem for binary convexity was obtained in [11] ). Theorem 1. Let C be a T 2 binary convexity on a continuum X and F : X ⊸ X is a USC multimap with values in C. Then F has a fixed point.
We use definitions and notations from Section 2.
is an equilibrium under uncertainty with Sugeno payoff, where µ * i = ⊗ j =i µ j Proof. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} consider a multimap γ i :
Define a multimap γ : ∈ γ(α) and γ is USC.
We consider on n j=1 M (X j ) the family C = { n i=1 C i | C i ∈ C Xi }. It is easy to see that C forms a T 2 binary convexity on a continuum n j=1 M (X j ) (let us remark that each M (X j ) is connected). Then by Theorem 1 γ has a fixed point µ = (µ 1 , . . . µ n ) ∈ n j=1 M (X j ). Let us show that (µ * 1 , . . . , µ * n ) is an equilibrium under uncertainty. Consider any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then µ i (X i \ R i (µ * i )) = 0. We have by Lemma 1 µ * i ( j =i X i \ j =i R j (µ * j )) = 0. Remark 1. Many results of our could be deduced from general results obtained in [11] but we give direct (not difficult) proofs here because otherwise it would require introducing additional categorical notions.
